It is important to differentiate the consensus of the principals at this September meeting from the views which they had urged on the President in the preceding spring. In the spring the use of force had been clearly contingent upon a major reversal--principally in Laos--and had been advanced with the apparent assumption that military actions hopefully would not be required. Now, however, their views were advanced with a sense that such actions were inevitable. The actions that were approved against the DRV for the next three month period were highly limited and marginal in character.
They included resumption of the offshore U. From the September meeting forward, there was little basic disagreement among the principals on the need for military actions against the North.
What prevented action for the time being was a set of tactical considerations. The President was in the midst of an election campaign in which he was presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint as opposed to the quixotic Barry Goldwater.
Other concerns were the aforementioned shakiness of the GVN, the uncertainty as to China's response to an escalation, the desire not to upset the delicate Laotian equation, the need to design whatever actions were taken so as to achieve the maximum public and Congressional support, and the implicit belief that overt actions at this time might bring pressure for premature negotiations--that is, negotiations before the DRV was hurting.
In summary, the period saw the development of the consensus on military pressures against the North and the decision to defer them for temporary reasons of tactics. In the late fall of , President Johnson made a tentative decision in favor of limited military pressures against North Vietnam. He acted on the consensus recommendation of his principal advisors, a consensus achieved by a process of compromising alternatives into a lowest-common-denominator proposal at the sub-cabinet and cabinet level, thereby precluding any real Presidential choice among viable options.
The choices he was given all included greater pressures against North Vietnam. The Presidential decision itself was for a limited and tightly controlled two-step build-up of pressures. The first phase involved an intensification of existing harassment activities with reprisals; the second, which was approved in principle only, was to be a sustained, slowly escalating air campaign against the North.
The spectrum of choice could have run from a a judgment that the situation in the South was irretrievable and, hence, a decision to begin the withdrawal of U. The extreme withdrawal option was rejected almost without surfacing for consideration since it was in direct conflict with the independent, noncommunist SVN commitments of NSAM The opposite option of massive involvement, which was essentially the JCS recommendation at an early point in these deliberations, was shunted aside because both its risks and costs were too high.
Short of those extremes, however, were two other alternatives that were briefly considered by the Working Group as fallback positions but rejected before they were fully explored. While both came into some conflict with the commitments to South Vietnam of NSAM , they could have been justified as flowing from another long-standing U. These fallback positions were outlined in the following manner:. To hold the situation together as long as possible so that we have time to strengthen other areas of Asia.
To take forceful enough measures in the situation so that we emerge from it, even in the worst case, with our standing as the principal helper against Communist expansion as little impaired as possible. To make clear. In operational terms the first would have meant holding the line-placing an immediate, low ceiling on the number of U.
The second alternative would have been to undertake some spectacular, highly visible supporting action like a limited-duration selective bombing campaign as a last effort to save the South; to have accompanied it with a propaganda campaign about the unwinnability of the war given the GVN's ineptness and; then, to have sought negotiations through compromise and neutralization when the bombing failed.
Neither of these options was ever developed. The recommendation of the Principals to the President left a gap between the maximum objective of NSAM and the marginal pressures against the North being proposed to achieve that objective. There are two by no means contradictory explanations of this gap. One explanation is the way in which pressures and the controlled use of force were viewed by the Principals.
There is some reason to believe that the Principals thought that carefully calculated doses of force could bring about predictable and desirable responses from Hanoi. The threat implicit in minimum but increasing amounts of force "slow squeeze" would, it was hoped by some, ultimately bring Hanoi to the table on terms favorable to the U. Underlying this optimistic view was a significant underestimate of the level of the DRV commitment to victory in the South, and an overestimate of the effectiveness of U.
The assumption was that the threat value of limited pressures coupled with declarations of firm resolve on our part would be sufficient to force the DRV into major concessions. Therefore, the U. Another factor which, no doubt, commended the proposal to the Administration was the relatively low-cost-in political terms- of such action.
Furthermore, these limited measures would give the GVN a temporary breathing spell, it was thought, in which to regroup itself, both politically and militarily should stronger action involving a direct confrontation between the two Vietnams be required at some future date. And lastly, it was the widely shared belief that the recommendation was a moderate solution that did not foreclose future options for the President if the measures did not fully achieve their intended results.
The JCS differed from this view on the grounds that if we were really interested in affecting Hanoi's will, we would have to hit hard at its capabilities.
A second explanation of the gap between ends and means is a more simple one. In a phrase, we had run out of alternatives other than pressures. Bombing the North would fit that bill, and make it look like we tried. The President was cautious and equivocal in approaching the decision. Indicative of his reluctance to widen the U. Ambassador Taylor was sent back to Saigon in December after the White House meetings with the understanding that the U.
Government did not believe:. As with the discussions of the preceding six months, the decisions at the end of marked another step in the U. The following is a summary of the November-December, and January, deliberations. On the eve of the November election, and after the decision not to retaliate against the North for the VC attack on the Bien Hoa airbase on November 1, the President appointed an inter-agency working group and asked it to conduct a thorough re-examination of our Vietnam policy and to present him with alternatives and recommendations as to our future course of action.
That such a review should have been undertaken so soon after the policy deliberations and decisions of September is at first glance surprising. The President, however, was now being elected in his own right with an overwhelming mandate and all the sense of opportunity and freedom to reconsider past policy and current trends that such a victory invariably brings.
In retrospect, there appears to have been, in fact, remarkably little latitude for reopening the basic questions about U. NSAM did not seem open to question. In Vietnam, our now substantial efforts and our public affirmation of resolve to see the war through to success had failed to reverse either the adverse trend of the war or the continuing deterioration of South Vietnamese political life.
The September deliberations had produced only a decision against precipitate action and had done nothing to redress the situation. Significantly, however, they had revealed the existence of an Administration consensus that military pressures against the North would be required at some proximate future date for a variety of reasons. Now, in November, with a new electoral mandate and the abundant evidence of the inadequacy of current measures, the President was once again looking for new ideas and proposals--a low-cost option with prospects for speedy, positive results.
The Working Group's first job had been to examine U. This subject stirred some of the most heated debate of the entire Working Group Project. At the outset, the maximum statement of U. His forceful objections were effective and they were downgraded in the final paper which, while also pointedly rejecting the "domino theory" as over-simplified, nevertheless, went on to describe the effect of the fall of South Vietnam in much the same terms.
Specifically pointing up the danger to the other Southeast Asian countries and to Asia in general, the paper concluded:.
There is a great deal we could still do to reassure these countries, but the picture of a defense line clearly breached could have serious effects and could easily, over time, tend to unravel the whole Pacific and South Asian defense structures.
In spite of these concessions, the JCS refused to associate itself with the final formulation of interests and objectives, holding that the domino theory was perfectly appropriate to the South Vietnamese situation.
One of the other important tasks assigned to the Working Group was the intelligence assessment of the effectiveness of measures against the North in improving the situation in the South. The initial appraisal of the intelligence community was that "the basic elements of Communist strength in South Vietnam remain indigenous," and that "even if severely damaged" the DRV could continue to support a reduced level of VC activity. While bombing might reduce somewhat the level of support for the VC and give the GVN a respite, there was very little likelihood that it would break the will of Hanoi.
The estimate was that Hanoi was confident of greater staying power than the U. In deference to this view, the final Working Group estimate gave greater emphasis to the military effectiveness of strikes, although it was pessimistic about the extent of damage the DRV leaders would be willing to incur before reconsidering their objectives.
It concluded with the assessment that there was very little likelihood of either Chinese or Soviet intervention on behalf of the DRV if pressures were adopted by the U. As the Working Group toiled through November in its effort to develop options, it focused on three alternative courses of action. Option A was essentially a continuation of military and naval actions currently underway or authorized in the September decisions, including prompt reprisals against the North for attacks on U.
Option B augmented current policies with systematic, sustained military pressures against the North and a resistance to negotiations unless we could carry them on while continuing the bombing. Option C proposed only a modest campaign against the North as compared with option B and was designed to bring the DRV to the negotiating table. If that occurred the pressures were to be suspended--although with the threat of resumption should negotiations break down.
In the course of the month, these options converged and the distinctions between them blurred. In particular, option A was expanded to include some low-level pressures against the North; the negotiations element of option B was, in effect, dropped and the pressures were to be applied at a faster, less flexible pace; and option C was stiffened to resemble the first incarnation of option B--the pressures would be stronger and the negotiating position tougher.
Thus, by the end of the month when the Working Group's proposals were presented to the NSC Principals for consideration before a recommendation was made to the President, all options included pressures against the North, and, in effect, excluded negotiations in the short-run, since the terms and pre-conditions proposed in all three options were entirely unrealistic.
The policy climate in Washington simply was not receptive to any suggestion that U. And, in proposing pressures against the North, the Working Group was conscious of the danger that they might generate compelling world-wide pressure on the U. How large a role the specific perception of the President's views, validated or unvalidated, may have played in the Working Group's narrowing of the options is not clear. It seems likely, however, that some guidance from the White House was being received.
They were joined on November 27 by Ambassador Taylor. Taylor's report on conditions in South Vietnam was extremely bleak. To improve South Vietnamese morale and confidence, and to "drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role and obtain its cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency," he urged that military pressures against the North be adopted.
His report had a considerable impact on the Principals and later on the President. As the discussions continued through the several meetings of that week, opinion began to converge in favor of some combination of an "extended option A" and the first measures against the North of option C. In the end, the Principals decided on a two-phase recommendation to the President. Phase I would be merely an extension of current actions with some increased air activity by the U.
During this period, the GVN would be informed of our desires for its reform and when these were well underway, phase II, a campaign of gradually escalating air strikes against the North, would begin. This proposal was presented to the President on December 1.
He approved phase I and gave assent, at least in principle, to phase II. In approving these measures, the President appears to have been reluctant to grant final authorization for phase II until he felt it was absolutely necessary. If a consensus was reached within the Administration in favor of military pressures against the North, it certainly reflected no commonly held rationale for such action.
The State Department with the exception of George Ball and the civilian advisors to Secretary McNamara favored a gradually mounting series of pressures that would place the North in a slow squeeze and act as both carrot and stick to settling the war on our terms. As would be expected, State was also concerned with the international political implications of such steps. Bombing the North would demonstrate our resolve, not only to the South Vietnamese but also to the other Southeast Asian countries and to China, whose containment was one of the important justifications of the entire American involvement.
Walt Rostow, the Chairman of State's Policy Planning Council, took a slightly differently view, emphasizing the importance of pressures as a clear signal to the North and to China of U. Ambassador Taylor supported strikes against the North as a means of reducing infiltration and as a way of bolstering South Vietnamese morale.
As is readily apparent, there was no dearth of reasons for striking North. Indeed, one almost has the impression that there were more reasons than were required. But in the end, the decision to go ahead with the strikes seems to have resulted as much from the lack of alternative proposals as from any compelling logic advanced in their favor.
By January, for example, William Bundy, while still supporting the pressures, could only offer the following in their favor:. It is interesting to note that during the deliberations of September one of the preconditions to such strikes had been generally acknowledged as a unity of domestic American opinion in support of such Presidentially authorized action.
During the November debates, this is no longer an important factor. Indeed, it is openly conceded that such action is likely to evoke opposition in both domestic and international public opinion.
Another interesting aspect of this policy debate was that the question of Constitutional authority for open acts of war against a sovereign nation was never seriously raised.
Phase I of the newly approved program went into effect in mid-December. It had been foreseen that the number of sorties would slowly increase with each succeeding week. However, once the first week's level of two missions of four aircraft each was determined by Secretary McNamara, it became the guideline for the remainder of December and January. Furthermore, the public disclosure of information on DRV infiltration into the South was deferred at the request of Secretary McNamara. On December 24, the Viet Cong bombed a U.
For reasons still not clear, the Administration decided against such a reprisal. Thus, in purely military terms, the phase I period turned out to be little more than a continuation of measures already underway. One of the explanations for this failure to fully implement the December 1 decisions was the political crisis that erupted in South Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor had returned to South Vietnam on December 7 and immediately set about getting the GVN to undertake the reforms we desired, making clear to both the civilian and military leaders that the implementation of phase II was contingent on their efforts to revive the flagging war effort and morale in the South.
For his efforts, he was rewarded with a military purge of the civilian government in late December and rumored threats that he would be declared persona non grata.
The political crisis boiled on into January with no apparent solution in sight in spite of our heavy pressure on the military to return to a civilian regime. And, while Taylor struggled with the South Vietnamese generals, the war effort continued to decline. At the same time that Taylor had been dispatched to Saigon a vigorous U. The fact that our allies now came to expect this action may have been a contributing reason in the February decision to proceed with phase II in spite of the failure of the South Vietnamese to have complied with our requirements.
In any case, it added to the already considerable momentum behind the policy of striking the North. Clear indication that the Administration was considering some kind of escalation came on January Ambassador Taylor was asked to comment on a proposal to withdraw U.
While there is no indication of any decision at this point to move into phase II, it is clear that the preparations were already underway. During high-level USG discussions of the probable consequences, political and military, of Diem's downfall, conferees agreed military operations against the Viet Cong had not been and would not be particularly upset by the changed political situation.
Authorized planning for specific covert operations, graduated in intensity, against the DRV. State and ISA opposed overt military operations in Laos. Extension of CIA-sponsored covert activity in Laos was okayed: this neither threatened Souvanna's sovereignty nor openly violated the Geneva Accords which State termed basic to eventual political stability in the region.
Hanoi's reaction to them was forecast as mild. Phase One February-May included intelligence collection through U-2 and special intelligence missions , psychological operations and some 20 "destructive" undertakings. Similar operations would be increased in number and intensity during Phases Two and Three; destructive acts would be extended to targets "identified with North Vietnam's economic and industrial well-being.
But the committee cautioned, even successful execution of the program might not induce Hanoi to "cease and desist. Criticizing "self-imposed restrictions" on operations in Laos, arguing that Laotian security depended on that of South Vietnam, the JCS requested authority to initiate reconnaissance operations over and into Laos.
Without them the task in Vietnam was made "more complex, time consuming. Ambassador Lodge urged adoption of a "carrot and stick" approach to North Vietnam first presented to Governor Harriman on 30 October In exchange the U.
If Hanoi refused the offer, previously threatened punitive strikes would be initiated. President Johnson ordered more rapid contingency planning for pressures--covert and overt--against North Vietnam and ordered pressures shaped to produce the maximum credible deterrent effect on Hanoi. This decision reflects the convergence of 1 fear that the Laos situation could get worse; 2 knowledge that this would affect U.
Together, these factors increased the attractiveness of proposals for punitive, overt actions against NVN. The JCS argued the "root of the problem is in North Vietnam and must be dealt with there," but if operations against NVN had to be ruled out, operations in Laos must not be. They urged that Laos and South Vietnam be treated as an integrated theatre. The JCS favored closing such gaps by overt military operations; State opposed. The group believed unilateral U.
However, expanded activity could demonstrate U. Reasoned that if current USG policy toward Laos is changed e. The time has come to lift the restrictions which limit the effectiveness of our military operations. The Chiefs recommended direct strikes against North Vietnam. In line with their view JCSM that the root of the problem was North Vietnam, the JCS justified the need for overt action against NVN on two grounds: first, to support the short-term policy objective of stopping Hanoi's aid to the insurgents; second, to support the long-range objective of forcing a change in DRV policy by convincing Hanoi the U.
Reiterating his preference for the "carrot and stick" approach to Hanoi, Lodge opposed initiation of overt actions against North Vietnam. McNamara felt the practical range of overt actions did not allow assured achievement of practical U.
Like the Interagency Group, the Secretary distinguished between the stated aim of eliminating Hanoi's control of the Viet Cong and the practical objective of building the morale of the Khanh regime while eroding VC morale. He recommended initiation by GVN forces of "hot pursuit" and small-scale operations across the Laotian border, plus continuation of U. He recommended the U. He also recommended planning for 30 days' readiness to initiate the "program of Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.
Approved Mr. McNamara's report and his twelve recommendations to improve the military situation. Planning was to "proceed energetically.
On North Vietnam, the President indicated agreement with Lodge's "carrot and stick" approach and said he had reserved judgment on overt U. On Laos, the President said he was reluctant to inaugurate overt activities unless or until he had Souvanna's support and a stronger case had been made for the necessity of overt operations.
Otherwise the President felt such action ". Diplomatic relations had been reestablished. Laos granted free passage into southern Laos to GVN forces, the right to bomb infiltration areas with unmarked Ts and to conduct hot pursuit, commando raids and sabotage operations "without limit" into Laotian territory to combined RLG-GVN units. A combined Laotian-Vietnamese staff was to be created. The program was to "permit sequential implementation" of three actions border controls, retaliatory cross-border operations with hour responsiveness, graduated overt military pressures against NVN with days responsiveness.
Confirmed that actions with North Vietnam as the target mentioned in NSAM were regarded strictly as contingency planning and that interagency study was so oriented. The first was a scenario for current actions political steps to increase Congressional and international understanding of U. The third scenario--associated with overt U. Commenting on the 31 March scenario, the Joint Staff outlined a continually intensifying program of military pressures-and gradually increasing U.
J-5 urged the 31 March scenario be fused with OPLAN and border control operations be moved into the scenario for the current time period. Approximate time-phasing of the draft's then separate scenarios was recommended. Reflecting the JCS influence toward development of a continuous scenario, current political activities were treated in a separate section, "Steps Which Should be Taken Now.
Lodge objected to planning for-or adopting-massive publicity and massive destruction actions before trying a well-reasoned, well-planned diplomatic effort to convince Hanoi to "call off the VC. Rusk wanted the extent of NVN infiltration and support to be satisfactorily proved to U. Rusk did not think China would intervene militarily without Soviet support and thought we could pressure the Chinese economically through our allies. He doubted elimination of DRV industrial targets would have much adverse impact on any NVN decision to stop aiding the insurgency.
Results: Canada would be asked to act as interlocuteur. Also, Secretary Rusk recommended the U. The first stage could stand alone, but stage two could not be launched unless the U. Reasoning that deterioration in Laos and SVN would make it very difficult to win Hanoi's adherence to the Geneva Accords and predicting deterioration was imminent, Rostow implied necessary U.
This reflects the deliberate, cautious approach then dominant. In talking with General Khanh who suggested putting SVN fully on a war footing and wanted to tell NVN that further interference in GVN affairs would bring reprisals , Lodge urged Khanh to keep cool and asked that McNamara similarly emphasize the need to avoid such drastic measures during his 12 May meeting with Khanh.
JCS criticized the final draft scenario for omitting the immediate actions mentioned in NSAM border control and retaliatory operations ; advocated incorporating retaliatory and overt military pressures against NVN in the second stage, as well as battalion-size border control operations in Laos to include striking bridges and armed route reconnaissance. These were justified in JCS eyes because military operations against the DRV to help stabilize either the Laos or SVN situation involved attacking the same target systems and to a large extent, the same targets.
JCS felt attacks would assist ". Adlai Stevenson's major speech explaining U. With Souvanna's permission, the U. He asked Lodge to suggest ways to achieve greater solidarity in SVN saying, "we need to assure the President that everything humanly possible is being done both in Washington and the Government of Vietnam to provide a solid base of determination from which far-reaching decisions could proceed.
The crisis in Laos had focused interest on but one stage of earlier scenarios: overt operations against NVN. The scenario for steps to be taken now had been dropped as Rusk explained to Lodge on 22 May--State because initial attacks without acknowledgement were not feasible; publicity seemed inevitable. A Congressional Resolution supporting U. Negotiating objectives were: terrorism, armed attack and armed resistance would stop; "communications on networks out of the North would be conducted entirely in uncoded form.
NVN might order guerrillas to reduce "the level of insurrections for the moment" in response to U. If attacks continued, Hanoi might intensify political initiatives and possibly increase the tempo of insurgency.
If these failed to bring a settlement and if attacks damaged NVN considerably, the SNIE estimated NVN would lower negotiating demands to preserve its regime-and plan to renew insurgency later. Affecting the will of NVN leaders was emphasized. None of the actions forecast in the DPM would affect enemy capabilities because the major sources of "communist strength in SVN are indigenous.
Thus difficulties of comprehension might increase on both sides as the scale of action mounted. The ExCom abandoned the scenario approach-perhaps because entering into escalating conflict might obscure the limited U. The ExCom recommended the President decide that the U.
OR: The ExCom explicitly assumed that a decision to use force if necessary-backed by resolute deployment and conveyed every way possible ". Lodge said only firm action against North Vietnam by the U. A "new wrinkle" in Lodge's view.
Poland proposed a Laos conference format which avoided many undesirable aspects of those formerly supported by communist governments. The ExCom, preferring to initially treat Laos independently of Vietnam, recommended the President accept the Polish proposal. The Chiefs also outlined the capability to effectively destroy the entire NVN industrial base. Recommended the U.
They called for "positive, prompt and meaningful military action"-mainly air strikes-to show NVN "we are now determined that its support to insurgency will stop" and to show NVN we can and will make them incapable of rendering such support.
Conferees assessing overall U. Evaluating possible communist reaction to pressures against NVN, Mr. Westmoreland felt there was no significant unused capability left to the VC; Lodge said the VC had a major capability for terrorism, even for military action against Saigon.
Like Khanh, Lodge also felt selective bombing would build morale and unity in South Vietnam. Results: The U. The report to the President on Honolulu was probably based on this paper in which Bundy recapped talks there and called for time to "refine" plans and estimates, to "get at" basic doubts about the value of Southeast Asia and the importance of the U. McNamara discussed NVN targets, troop movement capabilities with the JCS 8 June ; he wanted facts and statistics on Haiphong traffic, existing plans for and estimated impact of mining the harbor, alternative DRV importation facilities.
He ordered immediate improvement in effectiveness and readiness plus some expansion of prepositioned stocks in Thailand and Okinawa. State began gathering information on prevalent public questions about the U. All of this was predicated on a clear-cut communist victory in Laos and South Vietnam and U. The Agency called results of a "fuzzy" outcome harder to evaluate.
McNamara supported Taylor's criticism of JCSM 2 June , agreeing that the two courses of action presented by the Chiefs were neither accurate nor complete. Taylor saw three ways in which air power could be used to pressure NVN--and opted for the least dangerous.
American forces were not directly involved in the raids and they were confined to support roles. All though the Spring and Summer of , the South Vietnamese attacked communist targets on the North Vietnamese coast. The plan was to dramatically change the course of the war, but not in the way that the planners had intended or that anyone could predict. The South Vietnamese had attacked a communist installation on the island of Hon Me. Some North Vietnamese patrol boats were dispatched to the area to pursue the attackers.
The North Vietnamese are alleged to have attacked the US Maddox and this destroyer called for assistance. Defense and CIA have together prepared a plan for covert operations against North Vietnam 2 which has been reviewed by Rusk , McNamara , McCone and myself, and we are united in recommending that you approve it.
In essence, the proposed program would involve the following: 1. Expansion of psychological operations by leaflet drops and phantom covert operations and increased black and white radio broadcasts from South Vietnam. Intensified sabotage operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel. Sabotage and propaganda operations in North Vietnam in the last year and a half have been most disappointing.
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